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Abstract 
 
Outdoor environmental education has long postulated a link between experiences 
outdoors in ‘natural’ environments and environmental concern. This paper suggests a 
straightforward relationship is problematic due to its implicit assumption of a nature/ 
culture divide. Critical outdoor education has sought to overcome this dualism by 
describing a relational understanding of the world emphasizing ecological systems and 
highlighting humanity’s ‘connection’ to the environment. This relational approach 
aims to tackle the ‘crisis of perception’, argued to be the root cause of anthropogenic 
planetary degradation. We draw from the philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari 
to suggest that relational ontologies, as currently conceived, may reinforce a static 
conception of the world by emphasizing ‘points of being’ (subject and object). Deleuze 
and Guattari proffer immanent materiality, where points of being are dispelled by 
movement and ‘becoming’. We then describe ‘animism’ as a mode of living where the 
world is understood to be immanent and constantly becoming. The consequences of 
animism are explored with regards to conceptions of ‘nature’, ‘place’ and ‘outdoor’ 
learning for sustainability. Creative practices to tackle the ‘crisis of perception’ are 
suggested as approaches that circumvent static conceptions of the world implied by 
points in relations and prevailing conceptions of nature as ‘other’. 
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Introduction 
 
Outdoor and environmental education literature has long postulated that learning experiences 
outdoors in ‘natural’ environments can result in pro-environmental awareness and 
action (Bögeholz, 2006; Bogner, 1998; Christie & Higgins, 2012; Cooper, 2010; Duerden 
& Witt, 2010; Ewert, Place, & Sibthorp, 2005; Higgins, 1997; Kals, Schumacher, & 
Montada, 1999; Knapp, 1999; Mittelstaedt, Sanker, & VanderVeer, 1999; Tarrant & 
Green, 1999; Wells & Lekies, 2006). Whilst the impetus for such research and theory 
can be traced back through the literature to earlier roots in the environmental movement, 
more recently these ideas have taken their cue from endeavours such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization decade of sustainability education, 
Section IV of Agenda 21,1 environmental non-governmental organization education 
programmes and research funding, and various national governmental education policies 
and initiatives (e.g. the Scottish Government’s emphasis on outdoor learning, education 
for sustainable development and global citizenship and the recent move incorporating these elements 
into the Professional Standards for teachers in Scotland) (Higgins & Kirk, 
2006; Martin, Dillon, Higgins, Peters, & Scott, 2013). 
 
As Lugg (2007) identifies, discourse concerning the capacity for outdoor experiences 
to inform environmental awareness and action has lacked a ‘learning process’ perspective, 
instead attempting to ‘prove’ that various forms of experience, in what are deemed to be 
natural environments, can result in measurable or observable outcomes. Sandell and 
Öhman (2013) suggest that this notion of a simple relationship between experiences in 
nature and environmental concern is problematic for two reasons. Firstly that it is difficult 
to prove such relationships in educational research, and secondly that ‘environmental 
concern’ can mean different things. Whilst these points are valid, there remains a third and 
more fundamental problem with this approach. Inherent in this perspective is the concept 
of a nature/culture divide whereby learners can be ‘exposed’ to ‘natural’ or ‘wilderness’ 
environments and then, presumably, returned to what logic would infer are the ‘artificial’ 
surroundings of their normal lives. Concurrently a more questioning ‘critical outdoor 
education’ has sought to tackle this implied dualism through an ecological and Earth 
systems perspective of holism (often promoting ‘ecological literacy’) highlighting how 
humans are ‘connected’ to the rest of the ‘natural world’ and emphasizing the implication 
of ‘social systems’ to a greater or lesser degree (Cachelin, Rose, Dustin, & Shooter, 2011; 
Colwell, 1997; Gruenewald, 2003; Magntorn, 2007; Martin, 2008; Thomas & Thomas, 
2000). These critical approaches can be said to rely on a relational understanding of the 
world where elements and parts interact in complex ways. Further to this, critical 
approaches highlighting a phenomenological understanding of the world, where experiences 
of ‘being’ and ‘dwelling’ are prioritized, have attempted to dispel dualisms and 
understand outdoor experiences in the ‘natural’ world (Bonnett, 2013; Payne & Wattchow, 
2010; Quay, 2013; Wattchow, 2004). In these approaches, ‘place’ is often highlighted, 
with some arguing that notions of place should be considered above ecological emplacement 
in systems (Bonnett, 2012). At its heart, the difference between these approaches is 
that of the ontological perspective taken. In this article we discuss these ontological 
approaches and suggest a way forward, to our knowledge not yet apparent in outdoor 
sustainability education discourse, which we believe requires us to think differently once 
again about how we tackle the ‘crisis of perception’, argued to be the root of humaninduced 
planetary degradation. 
 
Whilst the importance of ontology to research approaches has been examined in 
outdoor-related literature (Allison & Pomeroy, 2000), we discuss ontology here in relation 
to both the manner in which theory describes reality (i.e. objectively, subjectively or 
relationally) and the manner in which we, as learners and educators, see (and assume to be 
the nature of) the world around us. We argue that relational approaches underpinning 
critical outdoor sustainability education, although a step away from essentialist/reductionist 
paradigms (which are based on dualistic understandings of the world), often retain 
a binary bias that it may be helpful to overcome. Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) we contend that relational approaches which highlight our ‘relationship’, or 
‘connection’, or even ‘disconnection’ to ‘nature’, and, indeed, the concept of ‘nature’ 
itself, ultimately depict falsely boundaried entities. We then offer animism as a way of 
seeing founded on an ontology of immanent materiality as one direction through this 
problem. We use the term animism in a manner after the work of Bird-David (1999), 
Harding (2009), Descola (2011) and Ingold (2011) to describe a mode of being (becoming) 
that embodies both ‘seeing’ and ‘acting’ within a world ontologically understood by 
its inhabitants (animists) to be constituted by immanent materiality; to be whole, alive and 
forever becoming. Immanent materiality is opposed to the prevailing transcendental conception of a 
world of objects set in space that we experience as we go about our lives. 
Rather, it suggests a world of affect where the boundary between objects is dispelled, thus 
dispelling objects. Further to this, immanent materiality dismisses notions of a world 
understood to consist of ‘dualisms’. For instance, divisions between mind/body, agency/ 
structure and artificial/natural are eschewed. We suggest that this ontological understanding 
of the world—not primarily in an academic sense, but in our day-to-day assumptions 
regarding the nature of the reality in which we act as practitioners—could be of significance 
to outdoor environmental and sustainability education. We conclude by discussing 
what this philosophy of ‘becoming’ may mean for concepts of nature, place and 
‘outdoor’ learning in our practice and suggest some initial directions forward. Whilst the 
path this article takes may be interpreted as questioning the validity of positivist assertions 
about the world, we would stress that positivism is a way of seeing no less valid than 
others based on its ontological assumptions. However, whilst we have been made aware 
of the potential sixth mass extinction through moderately positivistic climate science, it 
does not mean we should continue to choose to base our reality, and indeed our resulting 
action, on a positivist model. 
 
 
Gaia theory and the ‘crisis of perception’ 
 
In Gaia theory, planet Earth is understood as a self-sustaining whole,2 each aspect working 
in a manner (without forethought or intention) that maintains the continuity of Gaia 
(Lovelock, 1979, 1988, 2006). Within this conception, human culture cannot be considered 
as anything other than a feature of planet Earth, and therefore of Gaia. Humans, and 
their produce, are as natural as a tree or a volcano. A volcano may, in fact, be the most apt 
analogy, as it is volcanic action that appears the most probable cause of the largest mass 
extinction the planet has faced since the appearance of life some 3,600 million years ago. 
The release of carbon dioxide at the turn from the Permian to the Triassic, 251 million 
years ago, resulted in a runaway positive feedback loop of warming—the greenhouse 
effect, which saw temperatures rise by 6°C, resulting in the loss of as much as 95% of all 
species on the planet (Benton & Twitchett, 2003). This is an achievement that we appear 
on course to replicate. The ‘natural’ self-regulation, the existence of which is still disputed 
(Moody, 2012), of Gaia is not without its hiccups then, at least from the perspective of 
valuing biodiversity. The International Panel on Climate Change3 (IPCC, 2007, 2013) 
state that the effect of humanity in the last 263 years has been significant, with geoscientists 
naming this era of the planet’s physical history the age of Humans (Steffen, Crutzen, 
& McNeill, 2007): 
 
We no longer live in the Holocene . . . but in the Anthropocene. Chemical, physical and 
biological changes are dramatic and sometimes frankly alarming: atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations are now at levels last seen more than two million years ago and rising fast; 
invasive species have been introduced to every continent and a sixth great mass extinction 
event may be with us in mere centuries; landscapes are transformed. Imagining a look back 
from some far future, it is hard to see how the twenty-first century could not be seen as a 
turning point in Earth history. (Zalasiewics, 2013, p. 9) 
 
Because of these effects, the ability for Gaia to continue to self-regulate in a manner 
supportive of current species—including humans—is under question, through a similar 
process to that which occurred 251 million years ago. 
 
Such is the consternation surrounding the term ‘Gaia’, due to perceived teleological 
connotations, that scientists examining the possibilities of self-regulation of Earth often refer to 
themselves as Earth Systems scientists (Moody, 2012). Teleology is the ascribing 
of ‘purpose’ or intention to physical phenomena. It suggests an overriding plan or ‘end 
goal’ that, for some, infers a divine presence. Any implication of its occurrence in the 
biological sciences has been particularly contentious, with critics noting the logical 
problems inherent in the concept but also the difficulty of straightforwardly describing 
biological processes without implying teleology (Reiss, 2009). Earth Systems scientists 
are thus wary of the etymology of the term Gaia (deriving from the Greek goddess of the 
Earth). Where teleology suggests purpose, systems theory is concerned with effects in 
complex relationships that may produce ‘self regulation’ of phenomena. Systems theory is 
a way of conceiving of reality that prioritizes the relationships between components, or 
parts, of a larger whole. In this way, systems theory is concerned with understanding both 
substances and processes in non-linear terms, an approach distinct from the linear methods 
that underpin the reductionist worldview of mainstream scientific enquiry. Systems theory, 
then, may provide a direction forward for further understanding of self-regulation through 
negative feedback loops, said to be a key mechanism of Gaia as established by Lovelock’s 
Daisy World models (Lenton & van Oijen, 2002), but is also argued to be essential to 
sustainability education through the development of ‘systems thinking’ capacities 
(Sterling, 2004). Indeed, thinking systemically about how the human race is ‘connected’ 
to the rest of the world has grown in popularity in sustainability education and critical 
outdoor education discourse (Cachelin et al., 2011; Colwell, 1997; Cutter-Mackenzie & 
Smith, 2003; Gruenewald, 2003; Jordan, Singer, Vaughan, & Berkowitz, 2009; Magntorn, 
2007; Martin, 2008; Morris & Martin, 2009; Orr, 1992; Porter & Cordoba, 2009; Rose & 
Cachelin, 2013; Sterling, 2004; Strachan, 2009; Thomas & Thomas, 2000), with systems 
thinking constituting, for example, the metaphysical foundation for ‘ecological literacy’, 
as illustrated by Fritjof Capra (1996). Systems thinking is attractive as it is seen to tackle a 
‘crisis of perception’ in which the prevailing objectivist and positivist worldview implied 
by linear and reductionist approaches to knowledge generation (or knowledge ‘gathering’ 
from a positivist perspective) has a significant influence on western perceptions of the 
environment as separate from humanity. Within this view, fragmentation and instrumental 
rationality are prioritized over other modes of participating in the world, directly resulting 
in anthropogenic environmental catastrophe (Abram, 1996, 2011; Bohm, 1980; Capra, 
1996; Hamilton, 2002; Harding, 2009; Ingold, 2011; Merchant, 1994; Orr, 1992, 2004; 
Plumwood, 2002; Sterling, 2004). However, whilst the ‘crisis of perception’ may be a 
legitimate one, we will argue that systems thinking, and some popular conceptions of 
relational ontologies in general, may be open to some of the criticisms they seek to 
overcome. 
 
 
Relational ontologies: against pointillism, for a plane of immanence 
 
Relational ontologies, such as that which underpins systems theory, conceive of the social/ 
natural world as organized by relations rather than by substances (Emirbayer, 1997). In 
this way they seek to overcome dualistic thinking (most notably Cartesian dualism, which 
divides human rationality and the physical world into two distinct realities) (Castree, 
2003). Whitehead’s (1929) development of process philosophy is regarded as an important 
divergence from prevailing substance-orientated philosophies. Drawing from 
Whitehead, Stables (2007) expresses how, by moving towards process philosophy, a 
conception of environmental literacy should embrace both the reading and the writing 
of events. Describing how people respond to the world in terms of events and happenings over 
entities—that is, to constantly occurring processes rather than static objects—Stables 
notes: 
 
a sign(al) is more like a punch, a kick, or a charge than a ‘thing’: like a word in a text, it 
moves us on. (The word as black ink on white paper appears, of course, substantial, yet this 
too is fading away, but too slowly for us to notice.) (Stables, 2007, p. 60) 
 
Reality, then, is not simply defined by form or substance but by relations and processes. 
Relational ontologies can prioritize a topological sense of space as ‘weaving and relating, 
forever in the making’ (Wylie, 2007, p. 199), which supplants more static notions of 
Euclidean space (Marston, Jones, & Woodward, 2005; Wylie, 2007). Rather than relations 
being forged in an already-given space, relations are creative of spaces; they make spaces. 
In light of this, relational theories, such as Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and Bruno 
Latour’s actor network theory, and indeed ecological systems, propose an ontology 
‘between’ agency and structure, where the notion of two separate realms—mind and 
body, natural and cultural, subject and object, agent and structure—is illusory (Wylie, 
2007). 
 
On the divisibility of these binaries we would agree that there is no clear-cut boundary. 
As Hutchins (2010, p. 706), referring to the work of cyberneticist and process philosopher 
Gregory Bateson (1972), suggests: ‘the danger of putting boundaries in the wrong place 
is, as Bateson warned, that doing so will leave important phenomena unexplained, or 
worse, inexplicable’. However, we contend that the descriptions of many relational 
theories, including systems theory, still seem to separate and validate ‘objects’ by the 
very terminology used. For example ‘system’, ‘relation’, ‘between’ and ‘network’ suggest 
boundaried entities between the relations, ‘dots’ to be connected. These words imply 
points, parts, nodes and objects that, although connected to everything else (which is a 
leap from a ‘detached’ positivism or structuralism, and does not solely rely on a cognitively 
constructed reality as argued by constructivism), are still affected by remnants of 
binary bias due to the boundaried and thus static notions that they infer (Doel, 2000). 
 
Let us take an outdoor learning activity where students are asked to identify species in 
a local park as an example. The aim of the activity may be to help the students understand 
part of the ecosystem in the park, perhaps with a view to explore the nature and fragility 
of biodiversity. Identification sheets are dispatched and the students begin to name the 
species they encounter. The students are looking for ‘points’ in the eco ‘system’. Ingold 
(2011) draws from Deleuze and Guattari (2004) to suggest that there are three ways to 
consider an animal. The first is to signal its subjectivity with a name in the way we name 
pets. This is to anthropomorphize and to subjugate it. The second is to see it: 
 
as a living embodiment of certain attributes or characteristics by which it may be classed, as 
one sort or another. This is to make an object of the animal, and to group it under the 
anonymity of an appellative. Such is the way of science and the State, inseparable partners in 
the colonial projects of control by classification. (Ingold, 2011, p. 174) 
 
This, of course, is the only manner in which we name species in the West beyond the 
subjective, and is the mode of naming, and thus ‘seeing’, that the students are engaged in, 
in the activity above. It is the manner in which we refer to species during outdoor and 
environmental education practice, pointing here to Rhododendron ponticum and there to 
Columba palumbus. On this view, Alistair Reid takes issue:  
 
Say the soft bird’s name, but do not be surprised to see it fall headlong, struck skyless, into its 
pigeonhole—Columba palumbus and you have it dead, wedged, neat, unwinged in your head. 
(Alastair Reid, 1978, p. 3, cited in Ingold, 2011) 
 
The point is not reserved for scientific names but rather for the use of nouns in naming, as 
they falsely suggest that animals can be considered independently of their environments. 
In contrast to this is to regard the animal as a ‘going on’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 174). In this 
respect, the animal is considered a manifestation of its processes of continually coming 
into existence and acting. This is a view commensurate with that of process metaphysics. 
For example, in this way a wolf ‘is not fundamentally a characteristic or a certain number 
of characteristics; it is “wolfing”’ and is thus caught up in its relations with the world 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 265). The giving of noun names to both animals and places 
in the western tradition can be considered a form of metaphysical entrapment to a 
staticized4 worldview, as indicated by Reid (1978) above. Where verbs are active, 
nouns imply false permanence and affirmation. In this way, western language can be 
accused of painting a world of fragmentation and of objective forms over an animate, and 
living world. Bohm, the physicist and process thinker who advocates the ‘rheomode’, a 
verb-based language, suggests that we should be: 
 
emphasizing the role of language in shaping our overall world views as well as in expressing 
them more precisely in the form of philosophical ideas. For as suggested . . . these worldviews 
and their general expressions (which contain tacit conclusions about everything, including 
nature, society, ourselves, our language, etc) are now playing a key role in helping to 
originate and sustain fragmentation in every aspect of life. (Bohm, 1980, p. 39) 
 
With regards to our example, then, a species cannot be said to be a ‘separate’ process, 
let alone a separate ‘point’ within the (eco)system, because it is at once swept up in the 
processes in which it is going on. Whilst we have concentrated on the ‘animal’, the 
argument is by no means limited to these taxonomically defined ‘entities’, extending 
rather to incorporate any anthropomorphically established border or boundary. To tackle 
these established boundaries is to attempt what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) term an 
absolute deterritorialization. To consider the world as consisting of processes swept up in 
one single smooth space, or ‘plane of immanence’, rather than constituted of existent 
objects to be connected, whether animals, plants, oceans, nature, people or their produce, 
is a view distinct from many current relational understandings (i.e. systems theory, field 
theory and actor network theory). John Muir (1988, p. 110) famously suggested, ‘when 
we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe’. 
This may imply that we should examine the relations between different species in a 
Darwinian ‘tree-like’ hierarchy, yet Deleuze and Guattari intimate another way in which 
we can interpret Muir, using the example of a wasp and an orchid: 
 
The line . . . of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared deterritorialization: 
of wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive system, 
but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated 
from its own reproduction. A coexistence of two asymmetrical movements that combine to 
form a block, down a line of flight that sweeps away selective pressures. The line . . . does not 
link the wasp to the orchid, any more than it conjugates or mixes them: it passes between 
them, carrying them away in a shared proximity in which the discernibility of points 
disappears. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 324) 
 
The wasp could now be seen as the mobile sexual organ of the orchid just as the orchid is 
the wasp’s orgasm. In this way we do not concentrate on the relation of a species of fauna 
to a species of flora, as if they were isolated separate entities, because the orchid is the 
wasp(ing) and the wasp is the orchid(ing) just as we are not Homo sapiens but a haecceity 
(an individuation—a thing defined by aspects that make it a particular thing, rather than 
characteristics that make it a kind of thing) of interwoven lines of becoming, forming 
multiple knots both human(ing) and environment(ing) (see Ingold [2011, p. 91] for an 
excellent discussion, played out by an ant and a spider, of how relational ontologies can 
validate fragmentary views of reality by prioritizing impetus and orientation ‘from the 
points’, rather than the flow of materiality or the ‘lines of becoming’). This being the case, 
Deleuze and Guattari proffer the root-like mesh of the rhizome as the model of both the 
theoretical and the physical in opposition to the prevailing tree-like understanding of 
hierarchical ‘patriarchal, authoritative knowledge’ (Somerville, 2011, p. 72) and taxonomy 
by physical characteristics. 
 
Whilst relational ontologies try to expose the topological spaces and connections 
between the assumed nodes/dots/points in (for example) systems, Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) contend that ‘lines of flight’ (or ‘lines of becoming’) are not defined by the points 
they seem to connect (a concept that Doel [2000, p. 120] calls ‘pointillism’) and have no 
beginning or end, only middles. In this regard they can be considered physical flows of 
processual materiality. As Deleuze and Guattari state (2004, p. 323; emphasis added): ‘a 
becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the 
border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both’. ‘Becoming’, then, is the 
constant temporal motion of physical material (including energy and force) that constitutes 
all, without division or boundary, which produces an animate world devoid of 
dualisms or static objects. The term ‘becoming’ is used over ‘being’ because, although 
the latter is continuous and animate as opposed to static (like ‘to be’), it does not suggest 
continual transformation through time into something continually emerging as ‘becoming’ 
does. Wylie notes the contrast between a Deleuzian ‘becoming’ and a Heideggerian 
phenomenological perspective of ‘being’: 
 
The notion of becoming first captures the Deleuzian sense of a world continually in the 
making, continually proliferating. It also captures the strongly anti-phenomenological bent of 
Deleuze’s writing; in so far as ‘becoming’ is explicitly a radical alternative to what Deleuze 
would see as the static and sedentary tonalities of Heideggerian notions of dwelling and 
‘being-in-the-world’. (Wylie, 2007, p. 201; original emphasis) 
 
This point is perhaps the key element in our argument in this paper. The notion that 
essentialist positions in outdoor sustainability education literature are too simplistic is 
highlighted by critical outdoor education, but critical outdoor education may not go far 
enough in tackling the staticity implied by points in relations. Systems-informed critical 
outdoor education suggests the points of being relate to each other through a process of 
non-linear cause and effect; in contrast, a Deleuzian conception tells us the relation is one 
of affect,5 an inter-relation, and that as points disappear: 
 
there is nothing left for the spatial scientist but the play of joints (and . . . and . . . and) . . . 
What remains is precisely that which maintains the different detached pieces in their 
incalculable disjointure—AND . . . AND . . . AND—: the interval takes all; the ontology of 
being gets carried away by the conjunctives. (Doel, 2000, p. 130) 
 
In this way, points of ‘being’ disappear, and we are left only with movement, and 
subsequently a very different view of the world. With this understanding, phenomenological 
perspectives in outdoor education (where the subject that is dwelling in the world is 
a centralized ‘point’ of ‘be-ing’ and perception) require a sense of temporality that sweeps 
away the borders of the subject, the self, leaving a haecceity. 
 
In light of this philosophy of becoming, Coole and Frost (2010, p. 5) believe that the 
‘ways we understand and interact with nature are in need of commensurate updating’. 
Nature, as we shall discuss, is used here not as an aestheticized term referring to a green 
or wooded ‘other’, as is the case in much outdoor and environmental education literature 
and research, but as an all-encompassing word for the state of the world, the smooth 
space or ‘plane of immanence’. This understanding is characterized where Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004) demonstrate the difference between a transcendental plane of seeing 
built upon organization and development, of structure and genesis, in which the plane 
itself necessarily remains hidden or secondary, and a plane of immanence where 
materiality is prior to structure and genesis. In this way, the transcendental conception 
of the plane is one of: 
 
a plan(e) that cannot be given as such, that can only be inferred from the forms it develops 
and the subjects it forms, since it is for these forms and these subjects. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004, p. 293; original emphasis) 
 
This transcendental plane may appear in any view that ‘establishes the proportional 
relations of a structure’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 293). In our thesis, a transcendental 
plane is apparent in both reductive mechanism within educational endeavours and misconceived 
relational ontologies, prioritizing nodal or pointal conceptions of sustainability 
education (i.e. prioritizing points of being, whether the nodes in a system of relations or a 
single subjective observer). Deleuze and Guattari (2004) go on to illustrate the alternative 
in the immanent plane, or an immanent materiality. Within this conception: 
 
there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the 
formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis . . . There are 
only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages . . . 
We call this plane . . . the plane of consistency or composition . . . It is necessarily a plane of 
immanence and univocality. We therefore call it the plane of Nature, although nature has 
nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no distinction between the natural and the 
artificial. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, pp. 293–294) 
 
This ontology of becoming tackles the fragmentation implicit in a ‘pointillist’ paradigm 
regarding the current ‘crisis of perception’. It may allow us to open up to animistic ways 
of being (or becoming); and ways of viewing the material world that challenge the 
dominant mechanistic paradigm and yield more ecologically informed outdoor learning 
practice; practice that treats humans as ‘of’ the environment (and vice versa), rather than 
‘separate from’ or ‘in relation to’ it. Where systems theory informed practice prioritizes 
skills and values for tackling our place in a network of relationships, thus maintaining a 
distance between humans and the Earth, an ontology of becoming sees no distinction. If 
the success of sustainability education rests on the tackling of the ‘crisis of perception’ 
(the shifting of our perceptions to acknowledge the indissolubility of people and planet), 
then immanent materiality may have much to offer. 
 
 
Embracing immanent materialism: animistic perceptions through an ontology of 
‘becoming’ 
 
Although in its original and oft-implied conception animism is described as the imparting 
of spirit or teleological properties to ‘inanimate objects’ (see Tylor, 1874), we use the term 
in a manner after the work of Bird-David (1999), Harding (2009), Descola (2011) and 
Ingold (2011) to describe a mode of being (becoming) that embodies both ‘seeing’ and 
‘acting’ within a world ontologically understood by its inhabitants (animists) to be 
constituted by immanent materiality; to be whole, alive and forever becoming. Bird- 
David (1999) demonstrates how animism, rather than being a simple anthropomorphication 
of ‘objects’ encountered by a people, returns on the anthropologist to reveal the 
dualistic assumptions inherent within the western concept of anthropomorphication itself, 
and thus anthropology’s attempts to describe culture as distinct from nature. Animism 
cannot be said to anthropomorphize a separate world to the ‘human world’ because 
immanent materiality removes the conception of people as operating in a distinct ontological 
plane. Thus the notion of projection across a mind/body gap is eliminated. With this 
understanding, the requirement of ‘anthropomorphism’ is rendered an inversion of logic 
performed by those who hold a nature/culture dualism to be ontologically prior. As 
Descola points out: 
 
If one fully acknowledges this evidence, then it becomes scientifically risky to go on using, 
even as a methodological prop, a distinction between nature and culture which is so 
uncommon elsewhere. Nevertheless, this is what anthropologists of all persuasions have 
done for more than a century when they viewed non-modern cosmologies as differing from 
ours in that they incompletely objectify nature, shrouding it under a symbolic veil weaved by 
mystical minds incapable of dissociating what pertains to humanity and what pertains to 
beings and phenomena that exist apart from human will and action. (Descola, 2011, p. 14) 
 
Descola (2011) describes animistic societies as demonstrating an ontological understanding 
of similarity of interiority between human and non-human others, whilst acknowledging 
dissimilar physical appearances (physicality). In this way, although non-human 
others (whether stones, trees or human produce; axes, knives, mobile phones, coffee mugs 
and the air surrounding them all) take on appearances quite different from that of the 
human, they are understood to be of the same essence, animation and intentionality—that 
is, they are alive. This understanding of life moves beyond western conceptions of an 
‘internal animating principle that is installed in some things but not in others’ to embrace a 
process of unfolding of continuous and evolving lines of flight in which beings (becomings) 
of all kinds are constituted and ‘held in place’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 237). The integral 
place of difference within a plane of continuity (immanence) moves to fulfil Plumwood’s 
(2002, p. 60) requirement that, ‘dismantling a dualism based on difference requires the 
reconstruction of relationship and identity in terms of a non-hierarchical concept of 
difference’. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) description of the life-world as a meshwork of interacting 
lines circumnavigating to form rhizomes of becoming, as an animate meshwork 
that we all inhabit (or rather, which constitutes us all), is one that Ingold (2011) posits 
animists know as a fundamental worldview. It is a view of a world that, rather than 
existing objectively, is forever becoming. He suggests that, contrary to western conceptions, 
animistic peoples do not hold beliefs about objective ‘nature’, a fundamentally 
Cartesian approach based in a transcendental plane, but are united: 
 
in a way of being that is alive and open to a world in continual rebirth. In this animistic 
ontology, beings do not propel themselves across a ready-made world but rather issue forth 
through a world-in-formation, along the lines of their relationships. (Ingold, 2011, p. 63) 
 
Animists, then, see and act on a plane of immanent materiality, not believing about the 
world (i.e. attributing life to ‘objects’ that are considered inanimate and ‘other’), but 
becoming of the world. The most fundamental consequence of existing in a reality that is 
forever becoming, in the animistic sense, is the response of ‘astonishment’. For Ingold 
(2011), astonishment is the sense of awe that comes from being forever on the brink of a 
world becoming. It instils certain values, but importantly these values are directly manifest 
in a way of acting in the world, a way of responding predicated on ontologically understanding 
the world as becoming: 
 
Surprise . . . exists only for those who have forgotten how to be astonished at the birth of the 
world, who have grown so accustomed to control and predictability that they depend on the 
unexpected to assure them that events are taking place and that history is being made. By 
contrast, those who are truly open to the world, though perpetually astonished, are never 
surprised. If this attitude of unsurprised astonishment leaves them vulnerable, it is also a 
source of strength, resilience and wisdom. For rather than waiting for the unexpected to 
occur, and being caught out in consequence, it allows them at every moment to respond to the 
flux of the world with care, judgment and sensitivity. (Ingold, 2011, p. 75) 
 
These actions of ‘care, judgment and sensitivity’ that emerge from holding an animistic 
worldview potentially circumvent the notion of a ‘values/action gap’ problem of sustainability 
education highlighted by Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002). Animistic action is 
predicated on the tacit knowledge of reality, in a similar way in which taking action for 
perceived anthropocentric ‘gain’, before considering consequences to a broader deeper 
emplacement, may be resultant of a positivist and objectivist worldview as suggested by 
the ‘crisis of perception’ (Capra, 1996; Harding, 2009; Orr, 2004). To summarize, rather 
than asking why our professed values do not result in pro-environmental action, it may 
prove useful to move to examine how our often unarticulated assumptions about the 
nature (as in state) of the world we live in result in our current behaviours. 
 
Animism, then, is a mode of becoming, incorporating both ‘seeing’ and ‘doing’, 
which is open to, and respectful of, the immanent processes that constitute the world. 
Bird-David demonstrates the contrast, and validity, of animism to Cartesian dualism in her 
study of the Nayaka people of South India: 
 
Against ‘I think, therefore I am’ stand ‘I relate, therefore I am’ and ‘I know as I relate.’ 
Against materialistic framing of the environment as discrete things stands relationally framing 
the environment as nested relatednesses. Both ways are real and valid. Each has its limits and 
its strengths. (Bird-David, 1999, p. 78) 
 
However, where Bird-David sees no threat from framing the environment as composed of 
discrete objects, or points of being, our argument, echoing voices from within the 
sciences, philosophy and education, is quite the reverse. It is precisely the manner in 
which we staticize and fragment the world into objects, whilst reserving an ontologically 
distinct realm for the human mind, which lies at the heart of the ecological crisis (Abram 
1996; Bohm, 1980; Capra, 1996; Harding, 2009; Ingold, 2011; Merchant, 1994; Orr, 
1992, 2004; Plumwood, 2002; Sterling, 2004). We contend that this argument is as true 
for critical outdoor sustainability education, emphasizing relations to ‘nature’, as much as 
it is for outdoor education approaches based on essentialist interpretations of the world.  
The process of becoming animist should not be perceived as a choice to be made, but 
rather a way of becoming resultant of growing in a world that is demonstrably animate. 
That is, framed and presented as such. We believe ‘outdoor’ learning experiences offer 
great potential for demonstrating the animate nature of the world to learners, but that 
barriers to this approach also exist within current discourse. 
 
 
Animism and sustainability education: nature, place, creative ‘verbing’, story-telling 
and ‘outdoor’ learning 
 
Whilst critical outdoor education and deep ecology maintain that ‘we are part of nature’ 
(Cachelin et al., 2011; Cohn, 2011; Colwell, 1997; Gruenewald, 2003; Magntorn, 2007; 
Martin, 2008; Morris & Martin, 2009; Porter & Cordoba, 2009; Sterling, 2004; Strachan, 
2009; Thomas & Thomas, 2000), it has been our intention to demonstrate that ‘nature’ 
does not have parts and that the use of language which suggests a ‘reconnection’, or 
highlights the human place in a series of relationships with the environment, may do little 
to attain its goals of tackling the ‘crisis of perception’, in that it may enforce preconceived 
notions of nature and the environment as distinct from and distant to humanity. This 
appears a pertinent point for consideration given arguments in outdoor and environmental 
education that people should spend more time in ‘wild nature’ so as to develop affinity 
with the ‘natural’ environment and thus become more sustainably minded. We believe, 
however, that nature must either constitute all, or nothing. When, for instance, does 
plankton stop being ‘nature’? When it has gone through catagenesis and become oil? 
When the oil is refined into plastic? When the plastic is used in the production of an mp3 
player? Either each one of these processes is nature, or none of them are. As Morton 
(2007, p. 186) suggests: ‘we can’t mourn for the environment because we are so deeply 
attached to it—we “are” it’. Whilst some authors acknowledge that we should have a 
greater ‘situated’ and ‘process’-aware conception of nature in our practice (Sandell & 
Öhman, 2010), there remains a current in outdoor and environmental education research 
that appears unaware of Morton’s, and other eco-critics’, realization of the impossibility of 
a ‘disconnection’, instead resting on unarticulated assumptions concerning the nature of a 
human/nature relationship. In the dualist/essentialist camp, studies that differentiate 
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ experiences of ‘nature’ (Duerden & Witt, 2010), measure 
‘connectedness to nature’ (Liefländer, Fröhlich, Bogner, & Schultz, 2013) or, from a 
health perspective, use views, experiences or ‘doses’ of ‘nature’ or ‘green spaces’ as an 
intervention (Barton & Pretty, 2010; Kaplan, 2001; Maller, Townsend, Pryor, Brown, & St 
Leger, 2005; Ulrich, 1984; van Dillen, de Vries, Groenewegen, & Spreeuwenberg, 2012) 
are examples of these. We wonder how it is ever possible to have an ‘indirect’ experience 
of nature, or to seek out an experience ‘in nature’, when we are always, constantly, of 
nature? An ontology of becoming would imply that significant results produced by these 
studies demonstrate the strength of people’s perceptions and conceptions of a discrete and 
separate nature. This is in contrast to assumptions that afford a distinct type of ‘nature’, a 
genetic link to humanity that increases environmental concern or produces ameliorative 
effects as advocated by Wilson’s (1984) biophilia hypothesis and Ulrich et al.’s (1991) 
psycho-evolutionary stress reduction theory. We believe that something much more 
complex is at work here and that this realization opens up new ways of interpreting 
these results that move us away from practice that looks to ‘reconnect with nature’ in an 
interventionist sense. The extent to which these results may be resultant of socio-cultural 
habituation of a certain conception of ‘green’ environments and embodied placebo 
responses is worth exploring, for instance (Mcphie, 2012). We suggest that a discourse which 
reinforces a distinct and fragmented ‘nature’ is one to overcome if we are to 
promote animistic ways of seeing in our practice. Whilst we must be careful not to tar 
critical outdoor education with exactly the same brush of ‘oversimplification’, it remains 
the case that a simplification is present where any boundary of ‘being’ is placed between 
‘becomings’. With this in mind, relational or systems-informed approaches require a more 
nuanced understanding. Additionally, any static notion of ‘place’ as a site for education 
comes up for discussion. 
 
Wattchow and Brown (2011) argue for the replacement of ‘wild nature’ with that of 
‘place’, in their view a less romanticized term, which allows the contestability, in 
ecological, cultural and historical terms, of locations to surface. Morton demonstrates 
how places and animists become without the requirement for a staticized boundary of 
‘nature’: 
 
Indigenous cultures have not much time for nature as imagined in and against modernity. 
Animism is decidedly not nature worship. For example, according to Keith Basso’s study of 
the Western Apache’s use of narrative in the naming of places, there is no difference between 
a place and the socially reproving and improving stories that the Apache associate with it, and 
thus, there is no nature. There is no gap between the human and the nonhuman realms. The 
Apache view is much closer to ecology without nature than conventional ecocriticism. 
(Morton, 2007, p. 180) 
 
Place, in Morton’s (2007) description, is quite apart from the concept of ‘nature’ that 
suggests an aesthetic distance, where place draws people out into the world. Place-based 
education is receiving a great deal of attention in outdoor and environmental education 
literature (Gruenewald, 2003; Howard, 2012; Smith & Sobel, 2010; Somerville, Davies, 
Power, Gannon, & de Carteret, 2011; Wattchow & Brown, 2011). While, for example, 
Bonnett (2012) wishes to draw the conversation regarding our relationship with the morethan- 
human world from a broader discussion of an ecological whole to a localized 
conception of how we experience the world in specific places, we believe an ontology 
of immanent materiality, after Deleuze and Guattari (2004), necessarily allows both to 
occur simultaneously. Indeed from this perspective it is impossible to speak of people 
without also speaking of places (Ingold, 2011). Within an ontology of becoming, places, 
and the way they are experienced, must move from being to becoming. With this notion, 
phenomenological understandings of a subject being (verb sense) in the ‘whole’ must lose 
the final subject and ‘become’ with the rest of the world. Ingold tackles the realization of 
‘being’ moving to ‘becoming’ in regards to places with his concept of wayfaring: 
 
Here, surely, lies the essence of what it means to dwell. It is, literally to be embarked upon a 
movement along a way of life. The perceiver-producer is thus a wayfarer, and the mode of 
production is itself a trail blazed or a path followed. Along such paths, lives are lived, skills 
developed, observations made and understandings grown. But if this is so, then we can no 
longer suppose that dwelling is emplaced in quite the way Heidegger imagined . . . To be, 
I would now say, is not to be in place but to be along paths. The path, and not the place, is the 
primary condition of being, or rather of becoming. (Ingold, 2011, p. 12; original emphasis) 
 
How then might we tackle tacit assumptions of separation implied by western culture, 
which we believe are poorly assailed by calls for ‘reconnection’ in outdoor education 
literature, whilst also embracing ‘places becoming’ (or Ingoldian ‘paths’)? Gough (2008) 
opens up the static concept of ‘places as profoundly pedagogical’, instead demonstrating 
how places may become pedagogical through embracing post-structuralist tendencies. 
Gough’s concepts of ‘unnaming’ and ‘uncounting’ nature, drawn from the short stories of Le Guin 
(1986, 1987), resonate particularly strongly with our own thoughts, suggesting 
that we ‘could do with some creative unnaming in our work. We could start with some of 
the common names of animals and plants that signify their instrumental value to us rather 
than their kinship’ (Gough, 2008, p. 78). Further to this, we suggest room for the ‘creative 
verbing’ of the processes our students experience and become, the places, species and 
happenings we encounter. Ingold (2011) describes how the Koyukon of Alaska name 
animals as descriptions, stories and as riddles, sometimes only half described. In contrast 
to our, rather static, C. palumbus, the Koyukon have ‘flutters around the shore’ to describe 
the Spotted Sandpiper (2011, p. 169) and, perhaps most enigmatically, ‘far away yonder 
there appears a flash of fire’ for the vanishing Red Fox (2011, pp. 172–173). We see this 
as a way of working in contrast to our example in the park given earlier. Students can be 
urged to verb their surroundings, storying the world they encounter, whether ‘natural’ or 
‘artificial’. In this way they may see how materiality crosses this fictitious boundary 
passing from ‘life’, to the ‘built environment’, to ‘nature’ with no concern for such 
arbitrary borders. Stories, according to Ingold (2011), not only help to animate the 
world, but also spring from epistemologically firmer ground than approaches of classification 
and taxonomy. This is because classification categorizes a thing on the basis of 
intrinsic characteristics, independent of the context in which it is constituted, the relations 
that have immediately gone before it, currently surround it or will follow it: 
 
In a story, by contrast, it is precisely by this context and these relations that every element is 
identified and positioned (Ingold 2007a, p. 90). Thus stories always, and inevitably, draw 
together what classifications split apart. (Ingold, 2011, p. 160; original emphasis) 
In relation to place, Somerville et al. (2011) draw from Deleuze and Guattari to 
suggest that the enabling of place pedagogies is constituted in the stories (and other 
representations) we tell of places, opening up the possibility of supplanting dominant 
narratives of inequality and colonization of places through establishing novel storylines 
(lines of flight). They promote a place pedagogy of ‘world-making’ where the deterritorialization 
of striated discourses is combined with the acknowledgement of the relationality 
of the world, a view commensurate with immanent materiality. Attempting animistic 
world-making through storying the world with outdoor learners will require experimentation 
and is a challenge we look forward to undertaking. 
 
A narrow understanding of ‘outdoor’ learning as a distinct site for sustainability 
education is of course rendered problematic by this view, which eschews an indoor/ 
outdoor binary. The very notion of being ‘indoors’ brings to mind a false boundary that 
Ingold (2011) suggests has resulted in the concept of ‘space’ being so prominent in 
western ideas of reality. We live, however, not in space, or in rooms that act as ‘an 
enclosed capsule for life suspended in the void’ (2011, p. 147), but along paths to places 
(although never arriving), where each path is a line of human movement. Places, then, are 
not defined by an outer boundary to possible movement, but by movement itself (Ingold, 
2011). ‘Outdoor’ learning may be understood in a broader sense, then, as a mode of 
learning both indoors and out, by examining the root of the word ‘room’. ‘Raum’ in 
German has a meaning contrasting with the English concept of enclosed space, instead 
suggesting ‘open space’. This is because the etymology of ‘raum’ comes from the clearing 
of a way through, the creation of ‘space’ (Ingold, 2011). In the English usage this created 
a fixed boundary around ‘room’, whereas in German the boundary of ‘raum’ was understood 
as a horizon ‘from which something begins its presencing’ (Heidegger, 1971, 
p. 154, quoted in Ingold, 2011). In this way we are never really ‘indoors’, but are constantly living 
‘outdoors’, of the weltraum (worldspace/room) beyond. Animistic ways 
of seeing are not boundaried and striated by western concepts such as indoor/outdoor. In 
practical terms, experiences of an animate world less influenced by homogenized human 
produce are more likely to demonstrate the essential ‘becomingness’ of the world— 
through, for example, learning as part of the elements (Higgins, 2010) and experiencing 
diurnal rythms (Faarlund, Dahle, & Jensen, 2007). The rich and visceral experiences 
provided by ‘outdoor’ learning are by no means compromised in a world becoming; if 
anything, they become more important. The world ‘becomes’ in countless ways and, 
although ‘indoor’ classrooms are also becomings, they can further a homogenized and 
staticized view of the world. Yet fixed conceptions of ‘nature’ as ‘other’, implied by 
suggesting we need to ‘(re)connect’ to it, do precisely the same thing. If we strive to 
deterritorialize these staid assumptions in current outdoor and environmental education 
discourse, it may lead to more flexible, productive and healthy interrelationships along the 
human–environment process. We contend that it is the manner in which reality is codepicted 
in learning situations, whether indoors or outdoors, that holds the most potential 
for sustainability education through animistic ways of seeing. 
 
A philosophy of becoming may have many implications for practice, with ‘unnaming 
nature’ and ‘creative verbing’ as merely initial suggestions. Certainly we should look to 
be cautious of the language we use to depict the world, but we may also look to assess our 
own assumptions regarding students, learning outcomes and attempts to reconnect with 
‘nature’. We by no means promote this perspective as an affirmation of the one truth, 
rather urging practitioners to consider what some of the points we have raised mean for 
their own practice. As Plumwood writes on the problem of overcoming dualisms in 
environmental philosophy: 
 
The path to the promised land of reflective practice passes over the Swamp of Affirmation, 
which careful and critical travellers, picking their way through, can with some difficulty 
cross. Intrepid travellers who have found their way across the Swamp of Affirmation into the 
lands beyond often fall either into the Ocean of Continuity on the one side or stray in the 
waterless and alien Desert of Difference on the other, there to perish. The pilgrim’s path to the 
promised land leads along a narrow way between these two hazards, and involves heeding 
both difference and continuity. (Plumwood, 2002, p. 3) 
 
Animism then, in the Ingoldian (2011) sense of ontologically understanding the world 
as immanently material, supported by Descola’s (2011) conception of difference in 
physicality whilst acknowledging continuity in interiority, lands us somewhere on the 
path described by Plumwood (2002). Where exactly this is we might come to see by 
following it. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Section IV of Agenda 21 is concerned with the implementation of Agenda 21 (a non-binding, 
voluntary United Nations action plan for sustainable development). Section IV includes science, 
technology transfer, education, international institutions and financial mechanisms. 
 
2. Self, subject, individual, whether Gaia or a person, will seem a problematic concept given the 
philosophy described later. On a plane of immanent materiality, modes of individuation are different 
to the common understanding of a self-contained subject. They are haecceities: ‘You 
will yield nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, and that you are 
nothing but that . . . You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its 
duration)—a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least 
you can have it, you can reach it’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 289; original emphasis). In this 
way, the subject deterritorializes. 
 
3. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the body established by the United 
Nations to assess the scientific basis of a risk of human-induced climate change. They affirm 
‘with very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities since 1750 has 
been one of warming’ (IPCC, 2007, p. 3; original emphasis). The more recent IPCC assessment 
report (AR5) further establishes the prevalence, alarming degree and virtual certainty of human 
induced climate change (IPCC, 2013). The primary causes of this change in climate are fossil 
fuel use, land-use change and agriculture (IPCC, 2007), which are argued to be resultant of 
unsustainable hyperconsumption. 
 
4. Staticized is used here to describe the mode of misperception created by understanding the 
world to be transcendent (striated, structured, staid). Conversely, in a world understood to exist 
on an immanent plane there are only haecceities (becoming, movement, flux, conjunctives). 
 
5. Seigworth and Gregg have emphasized that there is no single, generalizable theory of affect and 
never will be: ‘Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted 
upon. Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state 
of relation as well as the passage (and the duration of passage) of forces or intensities’ (2010, p. 
1). Affect has been labelled as ‘forces of encounter’, ‘molecular events of the unnoticed’ 
(Seigworth & Gregg, 2010), a prepersonal, non-conscious experience of intensity (Massumi, 
2002) and an ‘Intermediary concept’ (Lapoujade, 2000, in Brown & Tucker, 2010): ‘. . . affect 
marks the indeterminate and eventful nature of concrete action as it expresses and further 
complexifies the material flux in which it participates’ (Brown & Tucker, 2010, p. 236; original 
emphasis). 
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